Ranking Transport Projects by their Socioeconomic Value or Financial Interest rate of return? by Alain Bonnafous & Pablo Jensen
Preferred Citation : 
BONNAFOUS Alain, JENSEN Pablo. Ranking Transport Projects by their Socioeconomic Value or Financial Interest rate 
of return? [CD-ROM]. In : WCTRS, ITU. 10th World Conference on Transport Research - WCTR'04, 4-8 juillet 2004, 
Istanbul, Turkey – (Selected Proceedings). 2005. 12 p. 
 
Ranking Transport Projects by their Socioeconomic Value or 
Financial Interest rate of return? 
 
Alain Bonnafous, Laboratoire d’Economie des Transports 
alain.bonnafous@let.ish-lyon.cnrs.fr 
Pablo Jensen, Laboratoire d’Economie des Transports and Laboratoire de Physique 






This paper discusses the choice by the public authority of the most efficient 
programme of infrastructure investments. More specifically, it studies the optimal 
ranking of the projects implementations when these projects are partially self-
financed by their own revenues such as tolled highways. In this case, the optimal 
investment programme must be defined under a constraint of annual subsidies. This 
paper demonstrates that the optimal ranking is not necessarily the ranking of 
decreasing socio-economic IRR.  
This counter-intuitive result can be demonstrated by a general approach. 
Analytical calculations are not useful in this discrete problems because each 
programme is an ordered subset of projects. Therefore, there is no continuous 
variation linking the various programmes and the usual tools of optimisation are 
useless, such as differential calculus. Thus, we adopt here a discrete optimisation 





Along the last century, the casting in the transport sector was apparently clear 
between private actors and the public sector. For instance, public authorities were 
generally in charge of financing and building new infrastructures. Nevertheless, an 
inflexion was observed during the nineties with a significant development of public-
private partnership (PPP). 
This paper deals with the new issues raised by the PPP system or, more 
generally, by any system in which the new infrastructure is partially financed by its 
users. Is there, in this case, a new economic rationality of public authorities? 
Particularly, is there an optimal way to rank projects? 
Before proposing some answers to this question, we briefly present a 
historical perspective of this new trend, showing that there is a paradox. After this, 
we calculate the amount of subsidies needed to transform any project into a 
profitable project. We then show that, when public subsidies are reduced, the priority 
of a given project is not adequately given by its Socio Economic Internal Rate of   2
Return (IRRse), but by a combination of its Socio Economic Net Present Value and 
the amount of subsidies it needs to become profitable. We demonstrate the relevance 
of our criterion by optimization algorithms previously developed for physical 
systems. 
 
2. A clear but paradoxical trend 
The practices of involving the private sector in financing, building and 
operating new infrastructures are increasingly observed. Thus, for developing 
countries, the World Bank registered
1 during the period 1990-2000, among 2500 PPP 
projects, 675 which were in the transport sector, representing an investment budget 
of 135 billions $. The OECD countries were similarly involved in new experiences 
such as the last tolled highways in France or some international high speed railways 
(Eurotunnel, Perpignan-Figueras,…). Three sets of reasons are usually given to 
justify this private sector involvement. 
The first set of reasons, which are the most frequently mentioned, relate to the 
ability of a private operator to manage the construction and operation of the project 
more efficiently. This amounts to assuming that the financial Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR) of the project is not the same depending on whether it is managed by an 
administration or public body or by a company which in theory keeps abreast of the 
progress in optimization techniques which is taking place all the time. This 
difference is explained in many ways: the private sector pays some categories of staff 
less well, is more flexible, offers faster construction times which speed up the return 
on investment and is also more able to resist political demands which generate 
additional costs.  
The second set of justifications is particularly relevant to countries which are 
relatively unaccustomed to tolled infrastructure. J.A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ and J.R. 
MEYER (1993) have observed that people are reluctant to accept tolls in the case of 
state-owned infrastructure but quite willing to do so when the infrastructure is 
financed by a private company. Bringing in the private sector is therefore often the 
only way of applying the "user pays" principle.  
The third set of justifications for the use of private finance relates to excessive 
public debt, either for the public sector operator taking on the project or the nation as 
a whole. In the case of the public sector operator, even if the debt associated with a 
project can be paid back by future revenue, the operator's additional debts can have 
adverse impacts on its rating on the financial markets. More generally, the national 
government may wish to limit public debt. For example, the countries in the 
European Economic and Monetary Union have been obliged to meet a public debt 
convergence criterion (a maximum of 60% of GNP). Apart from this specific case, 
any country with a national debt can wish to free itself from the "snowballing effect" 
by which debt charges increase the burden of the debt whenever interest rates are 
higher than the nominal rate of growth.  
Nevertheless, these justifications were not less relevant thirty years ago and it 
seems paradoxical that private company involvement in the development of major 
transport infrastructure is increasing at a time when the projects that remain to be 
constructed are considerably less profitable than those that are already in service. 
                                                 
1 World Bank PPI Project Database.   3
In the case of tolled roads for instance, in the three main countries concerned 
in Europe, France, Spain and Italy, there are already 28000 km into service. That 
means that the main corridors and the more profitable axes are operated from a long 
time. The situation is similar for the new high speed railways: the most profitable 
lines are already or will be soon in service and for the next projects the financial IRR 
are not sufficient for a self-financing. 
The paradox of the appearance (or reappearance) of the PPP in these 
circumstances has been already explained (Bonnafous, 2001) and deals with the 
formalization of the need of subsidies we will propose in the paragraph  3. 
Beforehand, we have to recall the logic of investment for both the private operator 
and the public sector in order to explore the financial logic of a PPP. 
 
3. The encounter of public and private investors 
From the classical point of view of microeconomics, it is assumed that a 
private operator implements a project if the expected IRR covers: 
-  the market interest rate, 
-  plus a risk premium which takes account of the uncertainties that necessarily affect 
assessments of, for example, costs and future traffic and revenue
2, 
-  plus a profit margin. 
Thus, with a market interest rate of 4 %, a risk premium of 4 % and a profit 
margin of 4 % too, the minimum targeted IRR will be 12 %. If the IRR of the project 
is any lower than this the operator will require a subsidy in order to reach 12 %. 
The public authority is likewise using the IRR of the project, namely the 
discount rate which cancels out its Net Present Value (NPV). Nevertheless the 
valuation of this NPV takes into account not only the future accounting of the 
operation but also those of concurrent operators and, more generally earns and losses 
of all the concerned agents, including external effects such as the users surplus, 
consequences on safety or environmental effects. For this socio-economic 
assessment, we will use the notation IRRse for the internal rate of return. 
In the tradition of public evaluation, a project is considered to be 
implemented when its IRRse is higher than a standard level
3. This border-line can be 
interpreted as a collective profitability condition: for any project having a lower 
IRRse than this standard level it is assumed that the destroyed wealth would be 
higher than the created wealth
4. 
In the case of infrastructures exclusively financed by public subsidies 
(excluding any user contribution), if we consider not only one project but a program 
of scheduled projects, the objective function is the NPVse provided by the program. 
Thus, the question of the optimal ranking is solved by the decreasing order of the 
IRRse’s and the rhythm of their implementation depends of the available budget. In 
the case of a PPP, and more generally when the projects are partially financed by the 
users, the objective function of the public authority still being the total NPVse of the 
                                                 
2 The risk premium may also include an additional amount to cover uncertainties about the stability of the country in 
question. This country spread can be very important in some developing countries. 
3 In the French case, this standard level (« taux d’actualisation du Plan »), is 8 % from the early eighties. 
4 That means that the NPVse of the project, evaluated with the standard level of interest rate, would be negative.   4
program, it is not obvious that the decreasing order of the IRRse’s provides the 
optimal ranking. 
In this case, which is typically the case of railways infrastructures, the socio-
economic efficiency of each unit of subsidy result not only of the IRRse of each 
project but also of its need of subsidy, which is itself depending of its financial IRR. 
Thus, we have to use the relationship between the need for subsidies and the level of 
the IRR (Bonnafous, 1999). 
 
4. A fundamental relationship 
In order to formalize this relationship we shall consider a standard project for 
which an investment C will be made for a duration d, which is the number of years 
over which it has been assumed that expenditure will be evenly spread. The net profit 
made by the operation of the project once it has come into service is denoted by a, 
and it has been assumed that this will increase by an annual amount b.  
This corresponds to the stylized, but nevertheless quite classical, account of 
costs and benefits that is set out in Figure 1. If it is assumed that the project comes 
into service at the date t = 0, annual expenditure between the dates –d and 0 will be 
given by c = C/d. The profit made once the project comes into service is assumed to 
take the form (a+b.t).  
 










The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of the project, namely the discount rate 
which cancels out its Net Present Value (NPV), is therefore a function of the four 
parameters c, d, a and b. We must compare this IRR to the Rate of Return that an 
operator can reasonably expect.  
In what follows we shall use the following notation:  
 
α   is the discount rate used to calculate the Net Present Value (NPV), 
0 α   is the discount rate which cancels out the NPV of the project, which is 
therefore its IRR, 
δ   is the amount by which the subsidy increases the IRR, 
τ   is the rate of subsidy, i.e. the percentage of c which is financed by 
subsidies. 
For a discount rate α , and the present value of cost and benefits from date –d 
to date T, the Net Present Value is given by the following expression:    5
 











In order to simplify the calculations that follow, we shall assume that the 
present value calculation has been extended to infinity, which will have little effect 
on the results because of the small influence of the distant future (and the known 
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A rate of subsidy τ lowers the annual cost of construction c to c(1-τ ) and 
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Which allows us to express the required rate of subsidy: 
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  Rather to analyze the properties of this function, we will use its graphic 
representation which shows clearly some economic consequences of these properties. 
  
5. Concavity and tyranny of the financial profitability 
What is of prime importance to us in this function is clearly the relationship 
between τ  and δ . However, equation (5) also shows that this relationship obviously 
depends on the values of the parameters c, d, a, b and, of course,  0 α , which   6
characterize the economics of the project and which are moreover linked together by 
equation (4) which established the IRR of the project  0 α . If we wish to represent 
equation 5 we therefore need to keep some of these 5 parameters constant and vary 
just those whose role we wish to demonstrate. This is the well-known nomogram 
technique.  
In this paper we shall only reproduce one of these nomograms, which will be 
sufficient to illustrate the point we wish to make (Figure 2). The values of c have 
been kept constant (assumed to be 100); as have those of d (5 years) and b (taken as 
1). We have plotted  0 α  against a. The IRR of the project  0 α  thus takes on a series of 
values between 2% and 14 % with a step equal to 0.4%. The function (5) which links 






Of course, these functions must in no way be considered as completely 
general because of the hypotheses which were made in order to develop them and 
which, in particular, relate to the time series of the costs and benefits of the project in 
question. For instance, it is possible (and easy) to modify equation [5] by 
hypothesizing of an exponential instead of a linear increase in demand. Nevertheless, 
none of our hypotheses are extraordinary, and the conclusions suggested by the shape 
of these curves can be accepted.  
It is quite natural for the need for subsidy to be an increasing function of the 
additional IRR which the operator must receive. However, the gradient of the curve 
decreases in a marked manner. This concavity is a counter-intuitive result: it means 
that the first differences between the targeted IRR and the IRR of the operation are 
extremely costly, particularly in the case of projects with a low IRR. For example, in 
the case of a project for which  0 α  = 4 % the plot of the subsidy rate against δ  
(shown in bold on Figure 2) shows that a subsidy rate in excess of 80 % is required 
to raise the IRR for the operator to only 8%. 
This first observation suggests that the leverage effect of public finance on the 
rhythm of investment will be more powerful when preference is given to projects, if   7
any exist, whose IRR is very close to the target IRR required by the operator. It 
suggests more generally that under a public budget constraint, the role of the 
financial IRR could be primordial in the determination of an optimized PPP program. 
 
6. How to find the optimal order for a set of PPP projects? 
To confirm this point, we will take the set of 17 toll highway projects for 
which homogeneous economical data can be obtained
5. Subsidizing rates have been 
calculated from equations (4) and (5), taking 8% as the target IRR. We assume that 
there exists a budget constraint the first year (F, in MEuros), this constraint 
increasing by 2,5 % yearly. To make clear the role of the budget constraint, we have 
changed its value between 1 and 1000 MEuros. For a given order of the projects, the 
value of F determines the rhythm of completion of projects, since each project needs 
to draw on this budget an amount τ .c of public subsidies each year. 
We first examine the interest of using the IRRse as a ranking criterion. For 
this, we calculate the NPVse returned by three different programs obtained by 
ranking the projects by alphabetical or inverse alphabetical order (simulating a 
random combination of the projects) or by decreasing IRRse. Figure 3 shows that the 
IRRse is clearly more efficient as a ranking criterion than randomness, which is not 
surprising. 
 
Figure 3 : Comparison of the NPVse returned by random ranking of projects or 




However, our previous discussion suggests that the IRRse is probably not the 
best ranking criterion, mainly if budget constraints are important. Therefore, we can 
calculate the NPVse outputs obtained by ranking the projects with two other criteria: 
the financial IRR and the « output », defined as O(i) = NPVse(i)/sub(i), where sub(i) 
represents the amount of public subsidies required by this project to obtain the 
                                                 
5 These 17 French projects were in competition in the early 90s. Most of them have been carried out with a small 
contribution from public money owing to the former French financing system of tolled highways (before the 
European reform).   8
targeted IRR (8%, as assumed above). In figure 4, we compare the total NPVse 
returned by the 17 highway projects for different rankings, as a function of the mean 
subsidy required by all the projects (<F>= 472). More precisely, we plot the % of 
gain obtained by choosing the specified ranking criterion compared to the total 
NPVse returned by using the IRRse as the ranking criterion. Note that the curve 
labeled "Optimum" (triangles) will be discussed below. The results presented in 
Figure 4 confirm our intuition : the pure financial IRR is a best ranking criterion than 
the IRRse, and this is the truer the tighter the budget constraint. When this constraint 
is lower than some value (close to one third of the average subsidy needed for a 
project), the NPVse output of the program obtained with the IRRse ranking is frankly 
disastrous when compared with the pure financial IRR order. 
 
Figure 4 : Comparison of the total NPVse  




Figure 4 also shows that our “output” criterion is even better than the IRR, for 
all the values of the public budget constraint. The point now is : can we find a better 
criterion ? Can we be sure to have found the best possible ranking? The problem is 
that, since a program is a discrete combination of all the single projects, we cannot 
use the standard analytical optimization techniques such as Lagrangian multipliers or 
functional derivatives to find rigorously the best criterion. Therefore, we are left with 
exploring the different combinations of projects to find the one that yields the highest 
NPVse. However, the number of possible orders (17! = 3 10
14) forbids an exhaustive 
examination of all the possibilities. Fortunately, several tools to explore efficiently 
the “landscape” of different combinations have been developed by several 
disciplines.  
 
Let’s present briefly the three most widely used methods. First, the 
“simulated annealing” (Kirkpatrick, 1983, van Laarhoven, 1992) method mimics the   9
way physical systems approach thermal equilibrium. The system is taken to a high 
“temperature” (introducing disorder, which allows to explore a large number of 
configurations), then “cooled” slowly, hoping that the internal dynamics of the 
system will steer it towards the optimum configuration, as happens with 
crystallization of materials. Second, “genetic” algorithms (Mitchell, 1996) draw 
inspiration from natural selection, where the convergence to the optimum is obtained 
by random generation of individuals (each configuration), their reproduction (for 
example, a linear interpolation) and their selection following the desired criteria. 
Finally, several algorithms were recently proposed mimicking the behavior of ant 
colonies (Bonabeau, 1999) which are able to find shortest paths from their nest to the 
food sites. For our problem, which is relatively simple, we have chosen a reliable 
algorithm, inspired from the Monte Carlo method. 
 
The algorithm can be summarized as follows. We start from an arbitrary 
initial state (random or given by the IRR order, this has no consequence on the final 
result, as shown in figure 5), we iterate the following process as many times as 
needed to converge. 
(1)  Two randomly chosen projects, i and j, are permuted. 
(2)  The total NVPse for this new ranking is calculated. 
(3)  The permutation is systematically accepted the new total NVPse is larger than the 
previous one. In this case, the “temperature” (explained later) is slightly decreased 
and we start over (step 1). 
(4)  However, to avoid the jamming of the system in a given configuration, we allow 
for a (small) probability of accepting the permutation even if it leads to a lower total 
NVPse, as in the simulated annealing algorithm. For this, we calculate 
p=exp((NVPse_new – NVPse_old)/T), where T is a “temperature”.  
(5)  We throw a random number q (0 < q < 1) and compare it with p. If it is lower, we 
authorize the permutation, otherwise, we cancel it. If the permutation is accepted, the 
temperature is slightly decreased. In any case, we start over, step (1). 
 
We have tested the robustness of the algorithm by changing the initial value 
of the “temperature” (see figure 5). This temperature, as in the simulated annealing 
algorithm, is an arbitrary variable that allows more or less large fluctuations around 
the maximum value at any iteration of the search. If a higher value is fixed, the 
fluctuations are larger, because rankings with lower total NVPse can be accepted, but 
the algorithm always converges to the same ranking. Figure 5 also shows that 
convergence to the same final, optimal ranking of projects is ensured for any initial 
state (IRR or random ranking). Our algorithm can therefore be trusted to find the 
unique optimal ranking of projects. 
 
   10
Figure 5 : Convergence to the optimum configuration 
 
 
Figure 4 shows the results obtained by the optimization algorithm. It confirms 
that the R ranking is the optimum, since it always corresponds to the value found by 
our algorithm. Even if this does not constitute a rigorous proof of the output criterion 
as the best ranking criterion, we can trust the generality of our optimization criterion. 
This kind of algorithms will certainly show its full power to study programs 
of interdependent projects, namely programs where TRI of one project depends on its 
rank (or even the date) of implementation. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Let’s summarize here our three main results, which may seem paradoxical 
but are a direct consequence of the present financial constraints. 
1)  When financial constraints are tight, the social return of a program of investments 
is higher when projects are ranked according to their pure financial characteristics 
(such as IRR), instead of their pure socioeconomic characteristics. 
2)  We have also confirmed the hybrid optimum ranking criterion : the “output”, 
defined as the ratio of the socioeconomic NPV to the amount of subsidy it needs. 
3)  Our optimization algorithm will certainly reveal all its power in more complex 
situations. For example, when the characteristics of the projects depend on the 
precise date of completion (because of external factors, such as international 
development) or on the precise order of completion (a project IRR can depend on the 
fact that another project has been completed previously). In those complex situations, 
analytical treatments are certainly difficult to imagine, and simulation tools such as 
those developed in this paper may turn out to be a powerful tool. 
Thus, because we were in the case of infrastructures exclusively financed by 
public subsidies, the objective function being the NPVse provided by the program of   11
scheduled projects, the question of their optimal ranking was solved by the 
decreasing order of their IRRse’s and the rhythm of their implementation depends of 
the available budget. In the case of a PPP, and more generally when the projects are 
partially financed by the users, the objective function of the public authority still 
being the total NPVse of the program, the decreasing order of the IRRse’s does not 
provide the optimal ranking: the pure financial IRR is a better ranking criterion, and 
this is the truer the tighter the budget constraint. 
Even if the ratio of the socioeconomic NPV to the amount of subsidy it needs 
is a still better criterion, and even the best, as confirmed by our optimization 
algorithm, we can conclude to the tyranny of financial profitability as soon as the 
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